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Abstract—Stellar is one of the top ten cryptocurrencies in terms
of market capitalization. It adopts a variant of Byzantine fault
tolerance (BFT), named federated Byzantine agreement (FBA),
which generalizes the traditional BFT algorithm to make it more
suitable for open-membership blockchains. To this end, FBA
introduces a concept called quorum slice, which consists of a
set of nodes. In FBA, a node can complete one consensus round
when it receives specific messages from nodes in a quorum slice
appointed by the node. In this study, we analyze FBA, whose
security is highly dependent on the structure of the quorum
slices, and demonstrate that it is not superior to the traditional
BFT algorithm in terms of safety and liveness. Then, to analyze
the security of the Stellar consensus protocol (SCP), which is a
construction for FBA, we investigate the current quorum slices in
Stellar. We analyze the structure of quorum slices and measure
the influence of each node quantitatively using two metrics,
PageRank (PR) and the newly proposed NodeRank (NR). The
results show that the Stellar system is significantly centralized.
Thereafter, to determine how the centralized structure can have
a negative impact on the Stellar system, we study the cascading
failure caused by deleting only a few nodes (i.e., validators) in
Stellar. We show that all of the nodes in Stellar cannot run
SCP if only two nodes fail. To make matters worse, these two
nodes are run and controlled by a single organization, the Stellar
foundation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, many cryptocurrencies based on peer-to-peer
networks use open ledgers called blockchains [1], on which
transactions are publicly recorded. Nodes that validate a set
of transactions that are going to be recorded in the blockchain
are called validators. To make an agreement among valida-
tors, a system has a consensus mechanism. Nowadays, many
blockchain projects utilize practical Byzantine fault tolerance
(PBFT) [2] as a consensus mechanism because it has some
advantages, such as a high transaction throughput and no
waste of energy [3]–[7]. Owing to these advantages, Stellar
also uses a variant of PBFT [2], called federated Byzantine
agreement (FBA) [8]. However, because PBFT requires to fix
the members participating in the consensus process in advance,
it is unsuitable for a blockchain with open membership,
where anyone can join in and out at any time.1 Therefore,
to overcome this limitation of PBFT, FBA provides an open
membership service based on a trust model, where anyone
can join the network, but only nodes trusted by others can be
validators. More specifically, in FBA, each node selects a set of
nodes that it trusts, which is called a quorum slice. To make an
1The Stellar whitepaper [8] never uses the term “permissionless
blockchain”. Instead, it uses the term “open membership”, but it is difficult
to distinguish the difference of the meaning between the two terms.
individual decision on a given statement, it needs to receive
specific messages from the members of its quorum slice. A
quorum is an union set of all slices for each member in it,
which leads to a global consensus on a given statement. Since
the behavior of members in a quorum slice affects the node
that creates it, the quorum slice is an important component of
the Stellar security. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no study on the structure of quorum slices
in the current Stellar system and how a poor structure can
affect the system. In this study, for the first time, we 1)
analyze FBA in terms of safety and liveness, 2) measure and
analyze the structure of Stellar quorum slices, and 3) evaluate
the robustness of the current Stellar system against cascading
failure. In the rest of this section, we briefly describe each of
our contributions.
FBA Analysis. For the FBA analysis, the term (f, x)-fault
tolerant (FT) system describes how vulnerable the system is
to a node failure. The variable f and x indicate the minimum
number and minimum fraction of faulty nodes that a system
cannot tolerate, respectively. Therefore, a (f, x)-FT system
implies that if more than x% (= 100·fN ) of all active validators
are faulty, where N indicates the total number of active
validators in the system, then the system will not reach any
consensus. Then, we find that the values of x and f in a FBA-
based system depend on the structure of quorum slices, and x
ranges from 0 to 1003 . From this, we conclude that the value
of x in FBA is always lower than or equal to that in PBFT,
because the latter achieves the maximum value of x (i.e. 1003 ).
Data Analysis. Next, to determine the values of x and f in
Stellar, we study the current structure of quorum slices in it.
To this end, we first collect data for existing quorum slices
in the Stellar system. With these data, we analyze various
characteristics of quorum slices and measure the influence of
each node in quorum slices quantitatively. In this process, we
use two metrics, PageRank (PR) and NodeRank (NR), where
NR is newly proposed to better reflect the concept of a quorum
slice. Based on this analysis, we find two issues in the current
Stellar system: 1) the size of the quorum slices is small, and 2)
the influence of each node is significantly biased. As a result,
we observe that the structure of quorum slices is significantly
centralized.
Cascading Failure. Finally, we study cascading failures in
the centralized Stellar system. According to our results, all
nodes get stuck after only two nodes fail. This implies that,
currently (Jan. 2019), the value of x in Stellar is approximately
4.5 (≈ 244×100), where the total number of active validators is
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44 and f is 2. To make matters worse, the two nodes that cause
the entire system to be stuck are run by the same organization,
namely the Stellar foundation, making Stellar vulnerable to
“single point of failures”.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
1) We analyze FBA and prove that it is not superior to PBFT
in terms of safety and liveness.
2) We conduct a data analysis on the Stellar system, and
show that the structure of quorum slices is highly cen-
tralized.
3) We study cascading failures considering the current
quorum slices. Our results imply that validators cannot
achieve a consensus after deleting only two nodes run by
the Stellar foundation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the background of Stellar. The analysis
of FBA and the Stellar system are described in Sections III
and IV, respectively. In Section V, we study cascading failures
of Stellar. In Section VI, we discuss the possible ways to
reduce the impact of cascading failures and their limitations.
We describe some related works in Section VII and conclude
in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND ON STELLAR
Stellar is an open platform based on a blockchain. It is
designed for providing the fast and low cost payment service,
including cross-border transactions. In this section, we review
the main features of Stellar relevant to this study.
Federated Byzantine agreement (FBA). FBA, on which
Stellar is based, generalizes Byzantine agreement (BA) to
express a greater range of settings. Therefore, PBFT [2], one
of the best known variants of BA, can be explained by FBA.
Note that BA is an algorithm that guarantees a consensus
despite the existence of some Byzantine nodes. The main
difference between FBA and traditional BA (or non-federated
BA) is whether they will support open membership, allowing
any node to participate in the consensus process if desired.
In the traditional BA, there is no open membership, which
must be set by a central authority in advance, to avoid Sybil
attacks [9]. On the other hand, in FBA, anyone can have a
chance to be in the membership list at any time as long as
it is trusted by others. More specifically, any node that has
been being included in at least one quorum slice can be in the
membership list.
In addition, to make nodes reach a consensus, SCP should
provide the following:
• safety. A set of nodes satisfies safety if no two of them
ever reach an agreement on different values at the same
time.
• liveness. A node satisfies liveness if it can reach an
agreement on a new value.
The quorum slice and quorum, key elements of FBA, are
explained in detail in the rest of this section.
Quorum Slice/Quorum. A node in the system must select
a set of nodes called quorum slice, each consisting of nodes
it trusts,2 and then receive specific messages from them to
make an individual decision on a given statement. A quorum
is a set of nodes that contains at least one quorum slice for
each of its members. Therefore, a quorum is a set of nodes
sufficiently large to reach a consensus within a system and a
quorum slice is a subset of a quorum that directly determines
a node’s consensus.
In fact, a node can belong to multiple quorum slices, and a
quorum slice may contain another quorum slice as a member,
called a nested quorum slice. Moreover, every quorum slice
has a threshold value, which can be different for each slice.
If the number of nodes above the threshold in the quorum
slice agrees on the same statement, then the node that has
selected the slice also agrees on it. Therefore, a quorum slice
formed carelessly can cause a failure of the consensus. To
prevent this, each quorum has to satisfy two quorum formation
conditions. The first is that any two quorums should have
an intersection even after deleting malicious nodes in the
quorums. This implies that an overlapping portion, consisting
of non-Byzantine nodes, must exist. The second condition is
that a quorum still exists after deleting Byzantine nodes.
These two conditions guarantee the system’s safety and
liveness. However, because the quorum slice structure depends
on user-configurable parameters, it is not guaranteed that
users will always form quorum slices that satisfy those two
conditions.
Types of node. Nodes in the Stellar system can be divided
into two types based on their properties:
• well-behaved nodes. These choose acceptable quorum
slices and respond normally to all requests from peers.
• ill-behaved nodes. These suffer from Byzantine (i.e.,
acting arbitrarily) or crash (i.e., stopping responding to
requests or halting) failures.
Thus, an ill-behaved node can send a fake message to others,
or fail to send a message at all. Note that a well-behaved node
may not work properly due to the effect of an ill-behaved node,
such as waiting endlessly to receive messages.
III. FBA ANALYSIS
In FBA, we can classify nodes into three groups according
to their properties. The first group A includes ill-behaved
nodes, and the second group B includes well behaved nodes
that cannot work properly because they are affected by ill-
behaved nodes (i.e., those in group A). The third group C
includes well-behaved nodes that are not affected by ill-
behaved ones, and thus, work properly.
When considering the three groups, SCP, which is a con-
struction for FBA, only guarantees the correctness of C under
the assumption that nodes in C satisfy the quorum formation
conditions, whereas the safety and liveness of groups A and B
are not guaranteed. Nevertheless, if most of the well-behaved
nodes in Stellar always belong to C, the system can be
regarded as secure.
2The terms quorum slice and quorum sets [10] are equivalent. In addition,
nodes in quorum slices are based on trust that already has exists in real life,
such as bank or financial institution.
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However, whether most nodes can still belong to C after the
failure of a few nodes depends significantly on the structure
of the quorum slices. This is because even with the same set
of nodes in A, the number of nodes in B could change by the
structure. For example, assume that a validator named Alice
is the only ill-behaved node. If every quorum slice in Stellar
consists solely of Alice, then they will all be affected by Alice’s
failure. In other words, once Alice goes to A, all the remaining
nodes would belong to B because their consensus process is
blocked due to the lack of messages from Alice. Therefore,
because there is no node in C, the safety and liveness for all
nodes are not guaranteed.
On the other hand, when all nodes evenly select members
in their slices, most of the remaining nodes are still in the
group C even after the failure of Alice node. In this case, the
safety and liveness of the system are much stronger than in
the previous case. This implies that the structure of quorum
slices can significantly affect the safety and liveness of FBA.
In fact, because in Stellar, users select trusted validators in
their slices manually, the structure of quorum slices may be
significantly unsafe, depending on users’ choices. Therefore,
it is possible for the system to have an inappropriate structure
of quorum slices where most nodes are in group B rather than
in C, even if the size of A is small.
To quantitatively measure the extent to which the structure
of quorum slices can affect the system, we define a (f, x)-
FT system, representing how much the system is tolerant to
ill-behaved nodes (i.e., the nodes in group A).
Definition III.1 ((f, x)-FT system). In (f, x)-FT systems, all
nodes can eventually agree on the same value that does not
contradict the history of a consensus process, if less than f
nodes are ill-behaved, accounting for x% of the total active
validators.
Note that the value of x in FBA can be changed depending
on the structure of the quorum slices. The smaller the values
of f and x, the less tolerant the system is to ill-behaved nodes.
The following theorem shows the range of x in FBA.
Theorem III.1. The value of x in FBA ranges from 0 to 1003 .
Proof. Let ts and tl be the thresholds for safety and liveness,
respectively, in an asynchronous deterministic system [2].
Then, the system is safe if less than ts nodes are ill-behaved.
Likewise, the system can exhibit liveness if less than tl nodes
are ill-behaved.
First, we obtain the maximum value of x as min(ts,tl)N ×100,
where N is the total number of validators in the system. Note
that N−ts−tl ≥ ts should met, because the number of nodes
sending a correct message should be larger than or equal to the
number of nodes sending an incorrect message3. Therefore, for
the maximum value of x, it is sufficient to calculate min(ts,tl)N ×
100, considering N ≥ 2ts + tl. To do this, we consider two
3Note that ill-behaved node is defined in Section II.
cases: 1) ts < tl and 2) ts ≥ tl. In the first case, the following
is satisfied.
max{min(ts, tl)} = max ts = max N − tl
2
Because N−tl2 is less than tl, the maximum value of ts is
N
3
according to the below equation.
N − tl
2
< tl ⇐⇒ N
3
< tl, ts <
N
3
As a result, the maximum value of x is 1003 . In the second
case, the below equation is met.
max{min(ts, tl)} = max tl = max(N − 2ts)
Similar to the first case, we can find out that the maximum
value of x is 1003 .
Next, we prove that the minimum value of x is 0. It is
sufficient to give an example where x = 0. We consider the
case where there are a sufficiently large number of validators
and every slice only contains the same three nodes. In this
case, when those three nodes fail, the entire system would be
stuck. Therefore, for a sufficiently large N, x is close to 0,
which completes the proof.
The above theorem states the maximum value of x is 1003 .
Note that the value of x in PBFT is 1003 because it can
guarantee safety and liveness until less than 13 fraction of
all nodes are Byzantine [2]. Therefore, Theorem III.1 implies
that FBA is not superior to PBFT in terms of safety and
liveness. As an extreme case, if the structure of quorum slices
is completely centralized (i.e., every node selects only one
common validator in its slice), the system collapses with a
failure of only one node, which implies that x is close to 0.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, we determine the characteristics of the
quorum slices in the current Stellar system and analyze the
nodes’ influence quantitatively. Further, through this analysis,
we confirm that the Stellar system is significantly centralized.
In other words, in the current Stellar system, 1) each quorum
slice contains only a few validators, and 2) the influence
among validators is highly biased.
A. Characteristics of Quorum Slices
Methodology. We join multiple nodes in the Stellar system as
validators (i.e., full nodes). Subsequently, we collect data on
the Stellar system through these validators. The data includes
the validators’ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, the generated
quorum slices, and a list of existing validators. For the data
reliability, we also collect the corresponding data from several
websites, such as mystellar.tools [11], stellarbeat.io [12], and
stellar.org [13], which provide information on the quorum
slices and validators.
In Section IV-A, we first measure the number of total
validators and quorum slices in the long and short terms
to investigate the characteristics of the quorum slices in the
system. Subsequently, we measure the number of nodes in
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(a) Total number of validators and quorum slices in the system over time (b) Number of validators in each quorum slice
Figure 1. Statistics of quorum slices and validators
Table I
MOTIVATIONS OF PLAYERS PARTICIPATING IN STELLAR AS VALIDATORS.
Purpose Type Number of players Rate (%)
For-profit Business with Stellar 23 74.2Stellar Foundation 3 9.7
Non-profit Individual 1 3.2
Unknown 4 12.9
each existing slice. To this end, we analyze data over the three
months, one month, ten days, five days, and one day before
January 29, 2019.
Results and Implications. The results are presented in
Fig. 1a, where the red and blue lines indicate the number of
validators (in the left axis) and the number of quorum slices (in
the right axis), respectively. As shown in Fig. 1a, the number
of validators during the period typically ranges from 57 to 67,
and the number of existing quorum slices ranges from 40 to
50. Moreover, only 31 validators remain active continuously
throughout the whole study period. This implies that there
are significantly small numbers of validators and slices in the
Stellar system, and to make matters worse, only half of the
existing validators are active continuously. The others are just
temporary validators that easily churn in and out of the system.
Fig. 1b represents the result of the number of nodes in each
existing slice. It shows that 58% of the quorum slices have
ten or fewer validators.
Causal Analysis. The first reason for the small number of
validators is the insufficient incentivization to make users par-
ticipate in Stellar as validators. Unlike many other blockchain
systems that give internal incentive to nodes participating in a
consensus algorithms (e.g., financial rewards such as mining
reward in the proof-of-work system), Stellar does not.
To investigate why the current validators are present with-
out such incentivization, we analyze the 31 validators that
were continuously active during the studied period. Note that
the others between 14 and 36 validators are just temporary
validators. Fortunately, those 31 active validators all have
exposed their identities (i.e., name, contact address, node ID
and description) publicly in the website [14] because they
need to advertise themselves in order to be trusted by others.
Therefore, with the data, we observe the characteristics of the
31 validators participating in the Stellar system.
These observations are shown in Table I, which classifies
the relationships between validators and Stellar into four
types. The first type indicates a player that has a business
with Stellar. For example, IBM is providing a blockchain-
based payment system with Stellar and runs nine validators.
Some organizations, such as satoshiPay or tempo.eu.com are
in partnerships with Stellar for building applications on the
Stellar platform. The second type is controlled by the Stellar
foundation itself, such as sdf validator1. The third type is a
node (run by an individual) that participates in the system
for better decentralization of Stellar, rather than for profit.
Furthermore, despite the website’s [14] information, there are
still some nodes whose identities or types are not clear, so this
kind of nodes is classified into the fourth type. From Table I,
we can see that 83.9% of validators (including types one and
two) are directly related to Stellar, 3.2% are non-profit, and
the rest is unknown. This implies that only a small number
of specific nodes that can receive external profits using Stellar
are motivated to work as validators. Therefore, if there is an
internal profit, nodes that do not receive external profits will
also be motivated to work as validators, leading to a much
larger number of validators.
In addition, the second reason for the small number of
validators (not only in the system but also in each quorum
slice) is that Stellar is based on a trust model. According to the
structure of the current quorum slices, participants in Stellar
network trust only a few organizations, i.e., those that are
significantly popular or highly relevant to them. For example,
satoshiPay whose quorum slice consists of sdf validator1,
sdf validator2, sdf validator3 and eno, is a micro-payment
solution company collaborating with Stellar. Considering that
sdf validator nodes are run by the Stellar foundation, one can
see that the quorum slice of satoshiPay consists of mostly
nodes that are in partnership with Stellar. This indicates that
a node tends to choose the validators to which it is related.
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Therefore, the trust model inevitably results in fewer nodes in
the slices.
B. Node Influence
Next, to determine what extent of the power in Stellar
is biased, we first visualize the structure of the quorum
slices. Subsequently, we measure the influence of each node
quantitatively.
Figure 2. Directed graph of quorum slices in Stellar
Visualization of Quorum Slices. Fig. 2 shows the structure of
the quorum slices on January 22, 2019, as a directed graph. In
this figure, each circle represents a validator, where the size of
the circle is proportional to the number of incoming edges on
each node. In fact, the edges in the directed graph are divided
into incoming and outgoing, depending on the direction. As
an example, for two validators A and B, if A generates its
quorum slice including B, an edge exists from A to B and
is referred to as the outgoing edge of A and the incoming
edge of B. In particular, the number of incoming edges of a
node can be indicative of the influence of a node because it is
proportional to the trust it bears. Furthermore, vertexes with
the same color are run by the same organization.
From Fig. 2, we can visually see which nodes are more
influential (i.e., the one with more incoming edges). Accord-
ingly, sdf validator nodes have the most incoming edges,
followed by eno and tempo.eu.com. In addition, there are
a total of 62 validators run by approximately 37 different
organizations.
Evaluation of Node Influence. Next, we analyze the influ-
ence of each validator quantitatively using two metrics: PR
and the newly proposed NR.
In a directed graph, the influence of a node usually depends
on both the number of incoming edges and the weight of the
edges. Therefore, to consider the weight of the edges, we adopt
PR [15], which is typically used to rank websites in the Google
search engine. Using PR, we can assign a higher score to
a node that contains many incoming edges from influential
nodes.
However, considering only the weight of each edge is not
sufficient to measure the influence of each node in Stellar
accurately. A quorum slice, which affects the node influence,
consists of a validator, a nested quorum slice, and threshold.
Thus, to measure the influence of one node in the FBA model,
we need to consider the following three elements:
1) The number of quorum slices that contain the node.
2) Whether an influential node chooses the node in its slice.
3) The value of the threshold (high or low) of the slice
containing the node.
While PR only considers 1) and 2), the proposed NR considers
all the three elements.
In Stellar, each quorum slice has a different power depend-
ing on who creates it. For instance, when an IBM’s node is
influential (i.e., many nodes have the node as a member of their
slices), the quorum slice of the IBM node has more power
than a lesser-known slice. Accordingly, for the elements 1)
and 2), NR considers the weight of each slice as PR of the
slice’s generator, who creates the slice. If there are several
generators for one slice, the weight of the slice is the sum of
the generators’ PR.
For the element 3), we give an example below for easier
understanding. Assume that a quorum slice of node n1 consists
of nodes n1, n2, and n3 with threshold 3, while another
quorum slice of node n4 consists of nodes n4, n5, and n6
with threshold 2. If node n2 fails, node n1 cannot achieve
the consensus, because n1 cannot receive the messages above
threshold 3 from the members of its quorum slice. Meanwhile,
even if node n5 fails, node n4 can still reach the consensus,
because its quorum slice has threshold 2. Thus, the influences
of n2 and n5 are different, depending on the threshold of the
respective quorum slices. More specifically, node n2 is more
influential than node n5. In general, the higher the threshold of
the quorum slice containing the node, the greater the influence
of the node.
Next, we define NR of node v as follows:
a0(Q, v) = 1, ak(Q, v) =
TQ
|Q| × ak−1(Q, v)
NR =
∑
Q∈Qv
∑
G∈GQ
PRG × al(Q,v)(Q, v)
(1)
In Eq. (1), the following notations are used; the set of all
quorum slices that include node v is denoted by Qv, and TQ
is a threshold of quorum slice Q. The number of members
of Q is denoted by |Q|. The parameter l(Q, v) is how many
times Q that includes node v is nested. Therefore, if Q =
{n1, {n2}, {{n3}}}, then l(Q,n1), l(Q,n2), and l(Q,n3) are
1,2, and 3, respectively. In addition, GQ is the set of nodes
(i.e., generators) that create the quorum slice Q, and the PR
value of G is denoted by PRG. For ease of understanding
NR, we present the following example. Assume that only one
quorum slice Q includes node v; Q = {t : 3, n1, n2, {t :
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Figure 3. NodeRank (NR) and PageRank (PR)
1, v, n3}}, and Q is created by two nodes whose PR values
are 0.01 and 0.02, respectively. Then al(Q,v)(Q, v) is
al(Q,v)(Q, v) = a2(Q, v) =
3
3
× a1({t : 1, v, n3}, v) = 1
2
,
and NR of v is 0.03× 12 .
We calculate NR of the nodes according to Eq. (1), and
normalize the values. Fig. 3 shows the result of the two
metrics, and the x and y-axes represent the names of the
validators and values of metrics, respectively. The red and blue
lines represent NR and PR, respectively. From Fig. 3, it can be
seen that three nodes, namely sdf validator1, sdf validator2,
and sdf validator3, have the largest NR and PR values,
implying that they are significantly influential. However, when
comparing their NR and PR values, the difference between
the NR values of sdf validators is small, while the difference
between the PR values of sdf validators is large. This implies
that the influences of sdf validators are similar in terms of
NR. In Section V, we will confirm that sdf validators have
similar influence with respect to cascading failure as the NR
result shows.
Consequently, according to these two metrics, we quan-
titatively show that the node influence is biased toward a
few nodes. Specifically, the three nodes run by the Stellar
foundation have the greatest influence.
Causal Analysis. This problem may also be drawn by the
fact that Stellar is based on the trust of users. Under the trust
model, it is inevitable for the node’s influence to be biased
toward well-known nodes or nodes directly related to many
others. Through data analysis, we confirm this and observe
that at least one of the sdf validator nodes is included in all
slices. Note that many existing validators are having business
with Stellar as shown in Table I.
Summary. In summary, our data analysis indicates that that
the number of validators in each slice is significantly small,
and that the structure of quorum slices is biased, which
indicates that the current Stellar structure of quorum slices
is highly centralized.
V. CASCADING FAILURE
In the previous section, we see that the structure of quorum
slices is highly centralized. In this section, we study cascading
failure. Note that cascading failure in interconnected systems
implies a situation where the failure of a few nodes triggers
gradual failure of other nodes. In the case of SCP, there might
exist dependent node failures because each node is designed
to be influenced by other nodes. This means that if one node
fails, it may be possible for another node to fail as an effect of
the failed node. Moreover, in Stellar, the degree of robustness
against the cascading failure would depend largely on the
structure of quorum slices. Thus, the current Stellar system
can be highly vulnerable to the cascading failure because of
a significantly centralized structure of quorum slices. To find
out how much the system can be currently weakened by the
cascading failure, we apply it to Stellar.
A. Cascading Failure in the Stellar system
We consider the quorum slices obtained from the Stellar
system on January 8, 2019, consisting of a total of 62
validators. We first define Failure ratio as follows:
Failure (%) =
Number of failed validators
Total number of validators
× 100.
Note that the number of failed validators are equal to the
number of nodes in group A or B, as explained in Section
III. As a baseline, 18 nodes (29% of nodes) in the Stellar
system were already offline for unknown reasons. In such a
state, we confirm that when one of the online nodes becomes
unavailable (i.e., it is forced to go offline owing to a targeted
attack, such as DDoS or network attacks [16]–[18]), the
node with the 18 offline nodes (i.e. (18+1)/62*100=30.6% of
the Stellar system) are unable to reach a consensus. In this
case, one can see that if one node fails, the system is not
significantly influenced.
However, the situation is very different when two nodes
become unavailable, as Fig. 4 shows. In the figure, the x-
axis represents all possible pairs of validators, and the y-axis
represents Failure, the percentage of nodes that becomes
unable to reach a consensus. Red dots represent cases when
the Failure ratio is above 90 %. Six such cases are shown in
the figure, and summarized as follows:
(1) sdf_validator1 and sdf_validator2: Failure =
100 %
(2) sdf_validator1 and sdf_validator3: Failure =
100 %
(3) eno and sdf_validator1: Failure = 90.3 %
(4) sdf_validator2 and sdf_validator3: Failure =
100 %
(5) eno and sdf_validator2: Failure = 90.3%
(6) eno and sdf_validator3: Failure = 91.9 %
The results show that the failure of two nodes with large PR
and NR values causes large portions of the system to fail.
To observe how cascading failure proceeds, we describe an
example, where sdf validator1 and sdf validator2 fail (case
1). Initially (round 1), 20 nodes fail to reach a consensus.
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Figure 4. Results of the cascading failure
Note that 18 nodes were already offline before deleting the
two nodes. The failure of these 20 nodes causes an additional
28 nodes (round 2) to fail (reaching a total of 48 nodes), and
those 48 nodes lead to failure (round 3) of an additional 12
nodes (reaching a total of 60 nodes). Finally, the failure of
these 60 nodes causes the remaining 2 nodes to fail (reaching
a total of 62 nodes) over two rounds (round 4 and 5). Because
the structure of quorum slices in Stellar consists of 62 nodes
(validators), all nodes fail to reach the consensus over five
rounds, when deleting only two nodes.
We note that the Failure is 100% in cases (1), (2), and (4).
This shows that under the current Stellar protocol, if only two
nodes are ill-behaved (i.e., two nodes go to group A), then all
the other nodes eventually cannot reach consensus, because
they all go to group B. To make matters worse, the two nodes
are run by the Stellar foundation, which implies that the Stellar
system is vulnerable to a single point of failure.
In Section III, we defined a (f, x)-FT system and showed
that the maximum value of x in FBA is 1003 . Considering
the result of cascading failure in the Stellar system, one can
see that Stellar is currently a (2, 5011 )-FT system (i.e.,
2
44 ×
100). Note that although there are a total of 62 validators,
18 nodes among them were offline; thus, when calculating x,
we consider only 44 who are active validators. As compared
with the best case in the FBA model (PBFT whose x value is
100
3 ), we can see that Stellar is much more vulnerable to node
failures.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Decentralized Structure of Quorum Slices
Because the Stellar system is highly dependent on the
structure of the quorum slices, a decentralized structure is
required for Stellar to be secure. However, we see that it is
highly centralized, based on our analysis result in Section IV.
To make the structure of Stellar decentralized, the number of
validators should be sufficiently large, and all validators should
be included in different slices evenly. However, it is hard to
increase the number of validators because currently, there is
no internal incentivization. Only a small number of nodes that
can benefit from external benefits are operating as validators.
Moreover, it is hard for all validators to be evenly trusted by
others because users tend to choose only a few validators that
are popular or in partnership with him/her. As a result, unless
there is no internal incentivization system, it would be hard
for the structure of quorum slices to be more decentralized
because of lack of participants. Furthermore, even if there are
many validators somehow, we cannot ensure that users would
include the validators equally in their slice by nature of a
trusting relationship. For these reasons, we expect that it is
not easy to make the structure of quorum slices in Stellar
decentralized.
B. Mitigation of Cascading Failures
In this section, we describe potential solutions to reduce the
impact of cascading failures and their limitations.
One solution is making the quorum slice structure of Stellar
similar that of PBFT because the maximum value of x in
Stellar is that of PBFT. However, there are some limitations.
First, to be the same with the PBFT style, every user is forced
to have the same slice; this would not be accepted in Stellar,
which claims that each user can have any desired quorum
slice. Second, unlike Stellar, where users select their validators
manually, PBFT allows the system itself to rearrange the slice
dynamically and securely depending on who is Byzantine.
Surely, if every user always monitors messages from selected
validators and changes its slice immediately whenever the
validators are considered to have failures, then Stellar may
work as a PBFT style. However, it is not practical to do so
because it requires that all users perform monitoring every
minute. In fact, to see how often users change their quorum
slices, we observed it every week for a month, and determined
that 53 out of 62 validators in the system (85.5%) had never
changed their slices. This suggests that most users tend not
to change slices. As a result, it may be hard to force users
to change their slices dynamically and securely as a PBFT
system.
Users can lower the threshold value of a quorum slice,
which would certainly increase the liveness of Stellar. How-
ever, this would also decrease the safety. Indeed, it would be
complicated to find the optimal threshold value to satisfy both
safety and liveness at the same time.
If many popular and important financial institutions partic-
ipated in SCP while advertising their nodes to others, Stellar
could have better liveness because a user could choose many
diverse validators, decentralizing the quorum slice structure.
Nevertheless, attracting such institutions to Stellar is still
challenging.
VII. RELATED WORKS
There are still limitations in applying PBFT in a public
blockchain. For example, because PBFT needs a large num-
ber of communications with nodes for the consensus, it is
unsuitable for a public blockchain that has to make consensus
with large groups. Furthermore, if PBFT is used in a public
blockchain, it would be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Despite
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these limitations, because PBFT has advantages such as high
transaction throughput and reduced waste of energy, there
have been many attempts to use PBFT in a public blockchain
consensus algorithm. In 2014, Kwon et al. proposed Tender-
mint [19], which is a combination of proof-of-stake (PoS) and
BFT. In Tendermint, nodes vote for validators and the voting
power is proportional to the stake deposited by voters. A block
is committed when more than 2/3 of validators agree on the
same block. In 2017, Gilad et al. introduced Algorand [20],
which scales the consensus to many users using the verifiable
random function (VRF) and assigns each node weight based
on the money the node has in its account. Algorand prevents
Sybil attacks by presenting more chances for weighted users to
be a member of round leaders. In addition, it prevents targeted
attacks using the VRF by making the attacker cannot predict
the random number that is used for electing the next round
leader. Additionally, many other public blockchain consensus
algorithms based on the PBFT exist, such as HoneyBad-
gerBFT [5], Zilliqa [4], and NEO [3]. Further, Ripple [6] uses
PBFT in a private blockchain, and Nimble [21] uses SCP in
creating cloud manufacturing platforms.
Bitcoin or Ethereum have been studied from various per-
spectives, such as analyzing the information propagation pro-
cess, mining and anonymity [22]–[29]. On the other hand,
there is a relatively small number of studies on other cryp-
tocurrencies [30].
As a measurement study, Gencer et al. evaluated the network
of Bitcoin and Ethereum using several metrics, and demon-
strated that the network is centralized [31]. While [31] focused
on an analysis of Bitcoin and Ethereum, which are the PoW-
based systems, we analyzed another consensus protocol in this
study. Moreover, we studied both the seriousness of the Stellar
system’s centralization among validators and its impact on the
entire system. Moreover, in contrast to our negative result,
another work [32] discovered that the correctness of SCP is
stronger than the one described in the Stellar whitepaper [33].
However, they assumed a moderately secure structure of
quorum slices. In contrast, in this study, we described that the
security of the Stellar system is significantly dependent on the
structure of the quorum slices, and analyzed the weakness of
liveness in the Stellar system, considering the current structure.
In fact, the concept of a quorum has existed for a long time
in distributed computing. It presents the minimum number of
votes on a given transaction required for a consistent operation
in a distributed system. The quorum-based system has been
used in various fields, such as a replicated database [34],
[35], algorithms for distributed mutual exclusion [36], and
protocols [37]. Additionally, studies for Byzantine quorum
systems have been done for consistency and data availability
in a distributed system upon Byzantine failures [38]–[40].
Nevertheless, it is difficult to apply these previous studies
to Stellar because they make different assumptions. Unlike
previous studies, which assume a fixed set of nodes in a
quorum, Stellar involves changing sets of validators over time
by allowing any node to participate in Stellar.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the first time, we analyzed the Stellar system, which is
currently in the top ten cryptocurrencies and is based on a trust
model with open membership. Through our FBA analysis, we
proved that FBA is not better than PBFT in terms of safety
and liveness. Especially in Stellar, which is a construction for
FBA, we analyzed the structure of the current quorum slices
and measured the centrality of the system using two metrics:
PR and NR, where NR is proposed as a new metric. These
two metrics demonstrate that the system is highly centralized
in a few specific nodes, three of which are operated by the
Stellar foundation itself. In addition, we found that a cascading
failure has a significant impact on the Stellar system. In fact,
the entire system can fail completely in sequence if only the
two nodes operated by the Stellar foundation are deleted.
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